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Abstract 
We propose a novel approach to identity-based choice that 
focuses on peoples’ representations of the cause-effect 
relationships that exist among features of their self-concepts. 
More specifically, we propose that people who believe that a 
specific aspect of identity, such as a social category, is 
causally central (linked to many other features of the self-
concept) are more likely to engage in behaviors consistent 
with that aspect than those who believe that the same aspect is 
causally peripheral (linked to fewer other features). Across 
three studies, we provide evidence for our approach to 
identity-based choice. We demonstrate that among people 
who belong to the same social category, those who believe 
that the associated identity is more causally central are more 
likely to engage in behaviors consistent with the social 
category. 
Keywords: causal reasoning, concepts and categories, 
decision making, identity-based choice, self-concept 
Introduction 
 
Personal identity, the features or aspects of the self-concept 
that people see as defining who they are as individuals, is an 
important driver of choice. Theories in psychology and 
economics hold that people are more likely to behave in 
identity-consistent ways. That is, people tend to behave in 
ways that are consistent with features of their self-concepts, 
in particular the social categories that they belong to (e.g., 
Markus & Wurf, 1987; Akerlof & Kranton, 2010). For 
example, according to these accounts, a person who 
considers herself a Democrat is more likely to vote for a 
Democratic candidate than a person who has not 
incorporated this social category into her identity (but has 
similar preferences and ideologies). 
Among people who consider themselves members of a 
given social category, there is, of course, variance in how 
likely they are to engage in identity-consistent behaviors. In 
this paper, we test whether the predictions of a recent 
theoretical account of how the self-concept is represented 
(Chen, Urminsky, & Bartels, 2016) describe differences in 
people’s likelihood of engaging in identity-consistent 
behaviors. This approach predicts that people who perceive 
a feature as more causally central (linked to many other 
features of the self-concept) will be more likely to act in 
identity-consistent ways than those who perceive the same 
feature as more causally peripheral. That is, a person who 
believes that being a Democrat was caused by other features 
of her identity (e.g., her values, personality traits, and 
relationships with family members) will be more likely to 
vote for a Democratic candidate than a Democrat who 
believes that being a Democrat is relatively unrelated to the 
other features of her self-concept. 
 
Identity-based Choice 
A large literature has investigated the effects of identity on 
choice. Much of this literature conceptualizes the self-
concept as made up of multiple identities (social categories) 
with potentially conflicting norms (LaBeouf, Shafir, & 
Bayuk 2010; Markus and Wurf 1987; Oyserman 2009).  As 
a result, increasing the salience of an identity through 
priming, identity threat, or social distinctiveness (i.e., 
making members of that social category the numerical 
minority in the decision context) prioritizes the norms 
associated with that group. 
Based on this research, much of the understanding of why 
people who hold the same identity differ in how likely they 
are to act identity-consistent ways lies in situational factors. 
When an identity is made salient in an environment, 
members of the social category are more likely to perform 
behaviors consistent with the group’s norms than when the 
social category is not salient (e.g., LaBeouf, et al., 2010). 
While situational factors powerfully influence people’s 
tendency to display identity-consistent behaviors, they 
cannot explain all variance: Two people who are members 
of the same social category may be confronted with the 
same situational constraints and demonstrate widely 
different behaviors. We propose that our understanding of 
how people represent their self-concepts can clarify why, in 
the same situation, people who share an identity may 
nevertheless vary in how likely they are to display identity-
consistent behaviors. So, unlike previous approaches to 
understanding identity-based choice, we focus on internal 
representations of the self rather than situational factors. 
The Causal Structure of the Self-Concept 
Recent research has found that beliefs about causal 
relationships are a critical part of people’s representations of 
the self. Inspired by a large literature in cognitive 
psychology that has found that features of a concept that are 
more causally central (i.e., causally linked to many other 
features of the concept) are perceived as most defining of a 
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concept (Ahn et al., 2000; Rehder & Hastie, 2001; Sloman 
et al., 1998), Chen et al. (2016) examined whether such 
causal beliefs also played a prominent role in the self-
concept. They had participants report the cause-effect 
relationships that they believed existed between aspects of 
their self-concepts and calculated the causal centrality of a 
feature by summing the number of other features a given 
feature was causally linked to as either a cause or an effect1 
(Rehder & Hastie, 2001). The results suggested that people 
perceive a feature to be important to the self-concept to the 
extent that it was causally central. Participants believed that 
changes to causally central features were more disruptive to 
the self-concept (made them into more of a different 
individual) than changes to causally peripheral features. 
Further, participants believed that a feature was more 
important to another person’s self-concept when that feature 
was manipulated to be causally central than when the exact 
same feature was manipulated to be causally peripheral. 
In this paper, we explore the implications of this approach 
to self-concept representation for identity-based choice. As 
causally central aspects of the self-concept are perceived as 
more defining or important to identity, this account predicts 
that a given feature will exert more influence on behaviors 
among people for whom that aspect is more causally central, 
compared to people who believe the aspect is more causally 
peripheral. This is consistent with theoretical accounts that 
suggest that aspects of the self-concept that are more 
important or central will influence behavior more (Markus 
& Wurf, 1987), and with research that finds that identity 
importance moderates the effects of identity salience primes 
(LaBeouf et al., 2010; Reed, 2004). These explorations of 
importance, however, provide little theoretical insight into 
why or how an identity becomes important. Our approach 
provides a psychological explanation, based on a large 
literature on conceptual representation, for what it means for 
an aspect of the self-concept to be important. 
Further, unlike previous research on identity-based choice 
that focuses on a single aspect of identity at a time, usually a 
social category, we explore how an identity fits into the 
broader self-concept. That is, we examine how people 
believe the social categories they belong to are causally 
related to the their individual-level traits such as memories, 
personality traits, and moral qualities. While a broad 
literature on the self-concept suggests that these individual-
level characteristics are an important part of how people 
think about the self and have significant impacts on their 
behavior (Bartels & Urminsky, 2011, 2015; Chen et al., 
2016; Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009; Strohminger & 
Nichols, 2014), there has been little overlap between 
research on self-concept representation and research on 
identity-based choice. 
                                                            
1 This operationalization of causal centrality is used in the 
current studies as Chen et al. (2016) found that it described 
participants’ judgments of identity better than an alternative form 
of causal centrality based on Sloman, Love, and Ahn (1998). 
Study 1 
We conducted a two-stage study during the 2016 
presidential election that explored whether voters for whom 
political party was more causally central were more likely to 
perform an identity-consistent behavior: vote for their 
party’s Presidential candidate. All participants belonged to 
the social category of Democrat or Republican and the study 
took place at a time when these identities were quite salient, 
so differences in voting cannot be explained simply by 
differences in the salience of social norms associated with 
and conveyed by membership in social categories. 
Method 
Participants Four hundred eleven U.S. Amazon 
Mechanical Turk participants completed the first wave of a 
larger study the day before the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
election. Of the participants who completed the first wave, 
355 participants responded to the second wave which was 
launched the day after the election. Of those 355 
participants, 166 reported being affiliated with the 
Democratic party and 77 reported being affiliated with the 
Republican party. Participants who reported being affiliated 
with one of these two parties had a relevant political identity 
and were therefore included in the analyses (n = 243). 
 
Procedure In the first wave, participants first answered 
questions about their demographics (gender, ethnicity, 
political ideology, political party, religion, income category, 
and education level). Then half the participants (the 
experimenter-defined condition) answered questions about 
the features of their political identity in which they reported 
their positions on eight major political issues (e.g., abortion, 
gun control, immigration, taxes, gay marriage, military 
spending, social programs, and marijuana legalization). To 
ensure that any results were not driven by our selection of 
features, the other half of the participants (the self-generated 
condition) listed eight different aspects of their political 
identity in an open-ended question. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of these two groups (self-
generated vs. experimenter-defined). 
Participants performed the listing causal relationships task 
(Chen et al., 2016) with 20 items: their political party and 
the six other demographic features they reported, eight 
features of their political identity, and five additional 
features (found to be important in previous explorations of 
personal identity; Chen et al., 2016): childhood memories, 
personal life goals, friendships, personal values and 
principles, and personality. 
In this task, participants reported the causal relationships 
between a set of features of the self-concept. Participants 
completed one trial for each feature in which that feature 
was the target (e.g., in Figure 1, “being a Democrat” is the 
target feature). In each trial, participants were asked to 
select the other features of the self-concept that they thought 
were caused by the target feature. Participants saw the target 
feature at the top of the screen (along with the question text) 
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and all of the other features, with check boxes, listed under 
it. They also had the option, at the bottom of the list, to 
select “None of these are caused by my: [target feature]” 
(see Figure 1). Participants could check as many options as 
they wanted (unless they checked the None option).  
 
 
Figure 1: Example trial of listing causal relationships task. 
 
From this series of questions, we calculated the causal 
centrality—the number of causal relationships that a feature 
is involved in as either a cause or an effect—of each feature. 
More specifically, on the trial in which the feature was a 
target feature, the number of selected features on that trial is 
equal to the number of causal relationship in which the 
target feature is the cause. The number of causal links that 
the feature participated in as an effect is calculated based on 
the number of times it was selected from the list of features 
in all the trials in which the feature is not the target. The 
sum of the number of links that feature was a cause and the 
number of links the feature was an effect provides us with 
the total number of causal links a feature participated in, our 
measure of causal centrality. 
After completing the listing causal relationships task, 
participants reported which candidate they supported and 
their economic and social ideology (1 = very liberal, 7 = 
very conservative). We computed an ideology index by 
averaging separate ratings of economic and social ideology. 
The day after the election, participants reported whether 
they voted in the election, which candidate they voted for, 
how satisfied they were that their party nominated Clinton 
or Trump, how they felt about the outcome of the election 
(happy, unhappy, and afraid, hopeful), and how involved 
they think they will be in future politics. The main 
dependent measure of interest was whether or not 
participants voted with their party. We predicted that 
participants for whom being a Republican or Democrat was 
causally central would be more likely to vote for their 
party’s candidate than those for whom these parties were 
more causally peripheral. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary Analysis Participants reported significantly 
more links to political party when they self-generated the 
features of their political identity (M = 9.92) than among the 
group who evaluated experimenter-defined features (M = 
7.53), t(241) = 2.71, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.65, 4.12]. 
Similar differences were observed in the total number of 
links between those evaluating self-generated features (M = 
156.04) vs. experimenter-defined features (M = 111.97), 
t(241) = 3.67, p < .001, 95% CI = [20.44, 67.70]. Because of 
these differences, we controlled for the survey version in the 
regression analyses reported below that use causal centrality 
to predict voting behavior. No effects of survey version 
were found. 
 
Voting Behavior Our sample consisted of 77 Republicans 
and 166 Democrats. The majority of these participants, who 
all had a party affiliation, reported that they voted in the 
election (Democrats: 92%; Republicans: 95%) and that they 
voted for the candidate that their party nominated 
(Democrats: 89%; Republicans: 71%). A logistic regression 
predicting whether participants voted with their party based 
on causal centrality of political party (the number of causal 
links political party had to other features) revealed that, as 
predicted, people who believed that their political party was 
more causally central were more likely to vote with their 
party than those who saw political party as more causally 
peripheral (B = .099, Wald χ2(1) = 8.67, p < .01). 
We also fit a logistic regression predicting whether 
participants voted with their party based on causal centrality 
of political party (the number of causal links political party 
had to other features), controlling for total number of links 
reported (among all features), survey version (experimenter 
defined vs. self-generated features), and party (Democrat vs. 
Republican). As predicted, participants who perceived their 
political party as more causally central prior to the election 
were then more likely to vote for their party’s candidate 
(based on the post-election survey; B = .15, Wald χ2(1) = 
8.95, p < .01) than those who had perceived their party to be 
more causally peripheral. We also found a main effect of 
party (B = -1.03, Wald χ2(1) = 7.94, p < .01) such that 
Democrats were significantly more likely to vote with their 
party. There was no significant relationship between voting 
and either survey version or total number of links reported. 
According to our account, people who believe being a 
Democrat or a Republican is more causally central are more 
likely to vote with their party because they perceive acting 
in identity-consistent ways as more congruent with who 
they are than those for whom political affiliation is causally 
peripheral. However, it also possible that the causal 
centrality measure is merely capturing differences in the 
strength of people’s preferences for the candidates or their 
ideology. To examine this, we tested whether the effect of 
causal centrality was explained by differences in the 
participants’ satisfaction with the candidate nominated by 
their party and their political ideology. We added ideology 
index and satisfaction as additional predictors in the 
regression reported above. We found that, not surprisingly, 
participants who reported greater satisfaction (indicated by 
smaller numbers) with their party’s candidate were more 
Think	about	you:	being	a	Democrat	
Which	of	the	other	features	of	your	personal	iden7ty	listed	below,	
if	any,	are	caused	by	you:	being	a	Democrat?	
	
You	may	select	as	many	or	as	few	features	as	you	see	ﬁt.	In	the	
below	list,	please	select	all	the	feature	that	you	believe	are	caused	
by	the	above	feature.	
Being	female	
Being	pro	gun	control	
Being	pro-choice	
Being	a	college	graduate	
None	of	these	are	caused	by	me:	being	a	Democrat	
.	
.	
.	
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likely to vote with their party, (B = -.88, Wald χ2(1) = 24.88, 
p < .01). More importantly, participants for whom being a 
Democrat or Republican was more causally central were 
more likely to vote with their party (B = .15, Wald χ2(1) = 
6.99, p < .01), even controlling for satisfaction with the 
party’s candidate and ideology. This result suggests that 
even among people who disapproved of their party’s 
candidate, people for whom political party was more 
causally central were more likely to vote with their party 
than those for whom party was more causally peripheral. 
Total number of links reported was also a significant 
predictor of voting (B = -.01, Wald χ2(1) = 3.96, p < .05). 
There was no significant relationship between voting and 
either survey version or ideology. 
In Study 1, we found that people who believed that their 
political identity was causally connected to more aspects of 
their self-concept were more likely to vote with their party. 
We have argued that fully understanding which members of 
a social category will behave in identity-consistent ways 
requires understanding how the social category fits into the 
broader self-concept. These results are consistent with our 
approach to identity-based choice, in which the driver of 
identity-consistent behaviors is not only membership in a 
social category (or possessing an aspect of identity) but also 
how causally connected that aspect is to other important 
features of personal identity. 
 
Studies 2A and 2B 
 
The results of Study 1 support our hypothesis that those who 
believe that an aspect of the self-concept is causally central 
will be more likely to act in identity-consistent ways. In 
Studies 2A and 2B, we extend this finding to a new social 
category, being a fan of a football team, and a new 
dependent measure, willingness to pay for an identity-
consistent experience. As in Study 1, we examine this 
identity during a time when it is likely to be salient, the 
week of the Super Bowl. 
 
Method 
Participants Three hundred sixty-six residents of the two 
states that were the home of the two teams in the 2016 
Super Bowl (North Carolina and Colorado) were recruited 
from an online paid panel, and completed the study one to 
three days after the Super Bowl. Twenty-six participants 
were excluded for not providing valid answers to the focal 
questions in the survey and thirty participants were excluded 
for failing an attention check, yielding 310 valid cases.2  
 
Procedure After completing an unrelated task from a 
different study (on hedonic adaptation), participants listed 
the ten things that most define who they are as a person (i.e., 
features of the self-concept). They then reported whether 
                                                            
2 Participants were excluded for not answering the open-ended 
identity feature questions (23), providing the same answer for all 
identity questions (2), or for providing a willingness to pay of 
$1,000,000,000,000,000 (1). 
they were a Denver Broncos fan, a Carolina Panthers fan, a 
fan of another team (which they specified), or not interested 
in football. Participants who reported not being football fans 
(n = 57) were excluded from the analyses, leaving 253 
participants who reported having the football fan identity.  
Participants completed a shorter version of the listing 
causal relationships task than in Study 1, comprised of the 
ten features they self-generated as being important to their 
identity and six additional aspects: being a fan of the team 
they specified, childhood memories, personal life goals, 
friendships, values and principles, and personality. 
The task focused on two aspects, being a fan of their 
favorite football team and the fifth feature that the 
participant had listed. We elicited the causal centrality of the 
fifth feature as a control, to account for potential differences 
in the general tendency to report features of the self-concept 
as causally linked. Participants completed two trials for each 
of the target features: one that measured the number of other 
features causing target feature (i.e., the feature’s causes) and 
another that measured the number of other features caused 
by the target feature (i.e., the feature’s effects). For 
example, a participant who reported being a Carolina 
Panthers fan would first be asked which other aspects of her 
identity caused her to be a fan of the Carolina Panthers. She 
would then be asked which other aspects of her identity 
were caused by her being a fan of the Carolina Panthers. 
The causal centrality of being a Carolina Panthers was 
calculated by summing the number of features selected 
across the two trials. 
Participants reported how much they would be willing to 
pay for a ticket to see their team play in the Super Bowl if 
their team made it the following year, the dependent 
measure. Participants then reported their interest in football 
on a 4-point scale (1 = very interested, 4 = very 
uninterested). 
 
Results 
On average, participants reported that three other features 
were causally linked to being a fan of their favorite team. 
The average willingness to pay to see their team in the 
Super Bowl was $475.77. The average interest in football 
was 1.6 on a 4-point scale (1 = very interested, 4 = very 
uninterested). 
We regressed willingness to pay on the causal centrality 
of being a football fan, controlling for the casual centrality 
of the control feature. As predicted, those who perceived 
being a fan of their favorite team as more causally central in 
their self-concept were willing to pay significantly more 
than those who perceived being a fan as causally peripheral 
(B = 57.742, p < .01).  On average, each additional causal 
link between football fandom and another feature of the 
self-concept was associated with being willing to pay an 
additional $58. 
As in Study 1, we examined whether the causal centrality 
measure was merely capturing differences in the strength of 
people’s preferences. We tested whether the effect of causal 
centrality was explained by differences in the participants’ 
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level of interest in football. We added interest in football as 
an additional predictor in the regression reported above. We 
also added income to examine whether our results could be 
explained by differences in income between those who 
believed being a football fan was causally central vs. those 
who believed that it was causally peripheral. As expected, 
participants who reported greater interest in football 
(indicated by lower numbers) were willing to pay more to 
see their team play in the Super Bowl (B = -280.58, p < 
.001). More importantly, participants for whom being a fan 
was more causally central were willing to pay more to see 
their team in the Super Bowl (B = 39.26, p < .05), even 
controlling for self-reported interest in football and income 
(Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Multiple regression predicting willingness to 
pay, Study 2A. 
 
Factor Beta SE t p 
Constant 914.10 242.80 3.77 <.001 
Fan Causal 
Centrality 39.17 19.74 1.99 .048 
Control Causal 
Centrality -8.47 12.02 -.71 .481 
Interest -283.41 78.99 -3.59 <.001 
Income -.001 .004 -.25 .803 
Note: Fan causal centrality and control causal centrality are the 
number of causal relationships that being a football fan and the 
control feature participated in. Interest was on a 1 to 4 scale where 
1 indicated the greatest degree of interest. 
 
The results of Study 2A suggest that football fans who 
believe that being a fan is causally central are more willing 
to spend in identity-relevant ways. We further demonstrated 
that causal centrality predicts identity-consistent behavior 
beyond simple measures of preference. This is consistent 
with the proposal that people for whom being a football fan 
is causally central act in identity-consistent ways because 
they believe it is more congruent with who they are in a 
broad sense, compared to those for whom fandom is 
causally peripheral. 
 
Study 2B 
 
Study 2B provides a direct replication of Study 2A, and 
allows us to further explore the relationship between causal 
centrality and identity importance. As previously described, 
the importance of an identity has been shown to moderate 
the effect of that identity’s salience on identity-relevant 
choice (LaBeouf et al., 2010) and has been theorized to 
predict which identities will exert more influence on 
behavior (Markus & Wurf, 1987). As causally central 
aspects of the self-concept are perceived to be more defining 
of the self-concept, one of the consequences may be that 
causally central aspects of identity seem more important. 
Thus, we predict that importance will mediate the impact of 
an identity’s causal centrality on identity-relevant behavior. 
 
Method 
Participants We recruited three hundred nine-eight 
Amazon Mechanical Turk participants from throughout the 
U.S. approximately 4.5 to 2.5 hours prior to the 2017 Super 
Bowl. Five participants were excluded for failing an 
attention check and one participant was excluded for 
providing the same answer for all the features of identity, 
yielding three hundred ninety-two cases.  
 
Procedure As in Study 2A, participants were asked to list 
the ten things that most define who they are as a person and 
whether they would describe themselves as a fan of NFL 
football. Only participants who answered yes to this 
question moved on to the rest of the survey (n = 242). 
Participants reported which team they considered 
themselves a fan of. 
Participants then reported how important (Reed, 2004) 
being a fan of their favorite NFL team was to their identity. 
The importance scale is composed of three items which ask 
how much participants felt being a fan of a team describes 
who they are, how much they identify with that group, and 
how much they admire the group. Participants answer each 
question on a 1 to 7 scale (7 indicates greater importance). 
Participants performed the same abbreviated version of 
the listing causal relationships task from Study 2A, in which 
they reported the causes of and effects of being a fan of their 
team (from a list of the ten self-generated features and six 
additional features: being a fan of the team they specified, 
childhood memories, personal life goals, friendships, values 
and principles, and personality). In this study, we added an 
additional feature as a control feature, “Level of Hunger,” 
which was found in previous studies (Chen et al., 2016, 
Experiments 1 and 2) to consistently participate in very few 
causal relationships, making it a good indicator of whether 
participants were inclined to report relationships merely 
because that is what the task involved. 
Participants then reported how much they were willing to 
pay to watch their team play in the Super Bowl, how likely 
they were to watch the 2017 Super Bowl, and how 
interested they were in football. Participants then completed 
a set of questions from an unrelated study. 
Results 
On average, participants reported four links to being a fan of 
their favorite team and a willingness to pay to see their team 
in the Super Bowl of $538.18. The average interest in 
football was 1.5 on a 4-point scale (1 = very interested, 4 = 
very uninterested). 
We regressed willingness to pay on the causal centrality 
of being a fan, controlling for the casual centrality of the 
control feature. As predicted, those who perceived that 
being a fan of their favorite team was more causally central 
in their self-concept were willing to pay significantly more 
than those who perceived that being a fan was causally 
peripheral (B = 33.74, p = .027).  On average, each 
additional causal link between football fandom and another 
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feature of the self-concept was associated with being willing 
to pay an additional $34. 
We added interest in football and income as additional 
predictors in the regression reported above. As expected, 
participants who reported greater interest in football were 
willing to pay more to see their team play in the Super Bowl 
(B = -208.87, p < .001). When controlling for income and 
interest in football, participants for whom being a fan was 
more causally central were marginally more willing to pay 
more to see their team in the Super Bowl (B = 28.16, p = 
.065). While we find a slight reduction in the effect of 
causal centrality in this study when controlling for interest 
in football, interest did not significantly mediate the effect 
of causal centrality. 
Next, we tested how the effects of causal centrality relate 
to prior findings suggesting that identity-consistent 
behaviors are influenced by identity importance (Reed 
2004). We regressed willingness to pay on importance. 
Importance was calculated by averaging the answers to the 
questions in each scale (larger numbers indicate greater 
importance). There was a significant relationship between 
importance and willingness to pay (B = 95.49, p = .015). 
We conducted a mediation analysis to test whether some 
of the relationship between causal centrality and valuation 
operates via importance of being a football-team fan. We 
found a significant indirect effect of causal centrality on 
willingness to pay via fan identity importance (B = 11.34, 
95% Bootstrapped CI = [4.76, 20.87]). The relationship 
between causal centrality and willingness to pay was 
mediated by importance and no longer significant when 
controlling for importance (B = 17.80, p = .198). 
The results of Study 2B replicate the findings from Study 
2A. Further, we found that importance of being a football 
fan mediates the effect of causal centrality on willingness to 
pay. These results suggest that one way causal centrality can 
influence identity-consistent behavior is by making an 
aspect of identity seem more important. 
 
General Discussion 
 
An important determinant of people’s behaviors and 
choices is how an aspect of identity fits within the broader 
self-concept. More specifically, we argue that beliefs about 
the causal relationships between features of the self-concept 
relate to how likely people are to display identity-consistent 
behavior. We have provided evidence that, consistent with 
our hypotheses, among people who belong to the same 
social category, those for whom the social category is 
perceived as more causally central are more likely to act in 
identity consistent ways than those for whom the same 
social category is more causally peripheral. Further, we 
have provided a more nuanced understanding for what it 
means for an aspect of the self-concept to be important to 
one’s identity. 
Our findings may also have important implications for 
behavioral interventions that use identity-based appeals 
(e.g., Bryan et al., 2011). While research on identity-based 
choice has mostly used situational factors to influence 
identity-consistent behavior, our results suggest that 
interventions that target the causal structure of people’s self-
concepts could provide additional ways to motivate such 
behaviors. 
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